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INTRODUCTION
Migrants are dying.1 Twenty-five-year-old Óscar Alberto Martínez Ramírez and his
daughter, twenty-three-month-old Valeria, were found face down on the bank of the Río Grande
* Juris Doctor Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, 2021; Bachelor of Arts, American
University, 2017.
1

See Dept. of Homeland Sec., U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sector Deaths by Fiscal Year,
https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-southwest-border-sector-deaths-fy-1998-fy-2018
(documenting 283 deaths at the southwest border in 2018 and a total of 7,505 since 1998).
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river last year.2 After they were unable to present themselves to U.S. authorities to request
asylum, the father and daughter drowned during their final attempt to reach the United States.3
Óscar and Valeria wanted a chance to present their asylum claim before U.S. officials, but
instead faced the turbulent waters of the Río Grande, that chance at asylum forever swept away
with them.4 Yes, immigration law is complicated,5 but human beings like Óscar and Valeria
deserve a solution.
The United States’ immigration system is broken.6 Immigration courts currently face a
backlog of over 900,000 cases.7 While asylum claims represent only a portion of the cases that
immigration judges hear,8 it is a critical one at that.9 Individuals, regardless of their country of
origin, have undeniable rights under both federal10 and international law11 to seek asylum in the
United States.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA)12 establishes “split authority” over asylum
adjudications. Some applicants appear before asylum officers at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)13 while others are heard by immigration judges housed in the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).14 DHS asylum officers
hear affirmative applications—those submitted by migrants within one year of their arrival to the
2

Peter Orsi & Amy Guthrie, A Grim Border Drowning Underlines Peril Facing Many Migrants, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/2f8422c820104d6eaad9b73d939063a9.
3

See id. (describing that Óscar became frustrated and decided that his family’s only option was to attempt to cross
the Río).
4

Id.

5

See U.S. Immigration Law: The Big Picture, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/us-immigrationlaw-the-big-picture (“Widely considered more complex than the tax code, U.S. immigration law is not something
you can learn in five minutes. Sometimes it doesn’t even make logical sense.”).
6

See, e.g., Amid “Nightmarish” Case Backlog, Experts Call for Independent Immigration Courts, A.B.A. (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/08/amid-_nightmarish-case-backlog-experts-call-for-independent-imm/ (imploring that action be taken to ensure migrants’ due process rights remain
intact).
7

See id. (quoting an immigration judge who called the current backlog “nightmarish”).

8

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2006) (allowing migrants to appear before the immigration court to protest their removal
orders); see also § 1421(b) (indicating that noncitizens in the process of becoming legal permanent residents or
naturalized citizens also appear before the immigration court).
9

See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 32627 (2007) (explaining that if asylum claims are not adjudicated fairly, they could result in an effective “death
sentence” for those asylum seekers whose cases are wrongly decided).
10

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (establishing that any “alien who is physically present in the United States or who
arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum).
11

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 14(1) (“Everyone has a right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”).
12

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

13

See id. § 451(b)(3) (establishing that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), an office of
DHS, will have statutory authority to review asylum and refugee applications).
14

See id. § 1102(3)(g)(1) (outlining that the EIOR is under the sole authority of the Attorney General).
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U.S.15 After submitting their initial application, affirmative asylum seekers are interviewed by
DHS asylum officers who either make a final determination or refer the case to the immigration
court for further review.16 Alternatively, those who are apprehended by DHS and placed in
removal proceedings can still apply for asylum, though their applications are considered
defensive.17 All defensive asylum claims are heard by immigration judges in the EOIR, which
consists of fifty-eight lower immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
the appellate body with authority to review the lower courts’ decisions.18
Thus, those responsible for upholding U.S. asylum laws are spread between two different
agencies, each with its own area of expertise.19 Though such overlapping authority among
administrative agencies is not uncommon,20 the adjudication of asylum claims deserves special
attention.21 The fair adjudication of asylum applications demands intense fact-finding,
individual credibility determinations, and up-to-date knowledge of the ever-changing
international “push and pull” factors22 behind one’s decision to migrate.23 The historical and
real-time expertise needed to determine the credibility of a migrant’s claim, coupled with the
emotional and psychological intelligence necessary to ensure a holistic understanding are what
make asylum adjudication unique.24

15

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 307; see also The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated April 19, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugeesasylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process.
16

See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 15.

17

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 305-06.

18

Id.

19

See infra Part.II.B.

20

See infra Part.II.A.; see also Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 238 (2011) (describing common criticism of regulatory overlap on the
ground that intersecting jurisdiction of administrative agencies leads to duplicative and sometimes contradictory
regulation which inhibits efficiency).
21

See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.

22

See generally Andrew R. Arthur, Looking for Push Factors in Central America, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Oct.
18, 2018), https://cis.org/Arthur/Looking-Push-Factors-Central-America (explaining that push factors are those that
force an individual to move, because the individual may be at risk if he stays, and pull factors are those factors in the
destination country that attract an individual to leave his home).
23

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 306
Asylum decisions, whether by asylum officers or immigration judges, involve both a judgment
about whether the applicant’s story, if true, would render the applicant eligible for asylum under
American law and an assessment as to whether the applicant is telling the truth about his or her
personal experiences of actual or threatened persecution.

(emphasis added).
24

Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (emphasizing that because
regulations are often complicated and convoluted, executive agencies are to have superior expertise in the niche
areas of the law over which they preside).
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With so many shifting variables, there is a heightened need for uniformity in asylum
adjudication to ensure due process.25 However, such uniformity in the application of
immigration laws is lacking,26 and major disparities in adjudication persist throughout the
immigration court system.27 Officials in both agencies are forced to dance on a tightrope
dividing the legal from the political and facts from emotions, inevitably destined to fall.
Honoring migrants’ due process rights should be at the center of any attempt at
immigration reform.28 Despite the constant skepticism and increased scrutiny that DHS has
faced under the current administration,29 there is no reason to think that the agency handcrafted
to execute the nation’s immigration laws is any less capable of doing so than the other executive
agencies that came before it.30 Instead of bolstering more attacks against DHS and the
immigration court system, Congress should take care of unfinished business and provide DHS
the statutory authority it needs to work efficiently.31 The lower immigration courts and BIA
should be relocated to DHS, the agency where expertise in immigration matters truly lies.32 In
turn, moving the immigration court system to DHS would make the agency more independent,33
25

See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
forbids the government from “depriv[ing]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law,” including
migrants).
26

See 2019 Update Report – Reforming the Immigration System – Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness,
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, A.B.A. COMMISSION OF IMMIGR. (March
2019) at UD 2-5 (pointing out that wide disparities in asylum grant rates, both between and within particular
immigration courts, persist).
27

See id.
In FY 2017, immigration judges granted asylum claims in approximately 20% of cases
nationwide. However, a number of immigration courts granted asylum claims at a significantly
lower or higher rate than the national average, and at significantly higher or lower rates even when
compared to immigration courts of comparable size.

28

See Immigration Court Independence, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/issues/immigration-court-independence
(“Due process rights and impartiality must be paramount in immigration court.”).
29

See Matt Ford, Dismantle the Department of Homeland Security, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/147099/dismantle-department-homeland-security (“The case for abolishing the
wasteful, incompetent, and abusive mega-agency has become especially urgent under Trump.”).
30

See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated March 6, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (describing USCIS as the office tasked with “administer[ing] the nation’s lawful
immigration system).
31

See Susan B. Glasser & Michal Grunwald, Department’s Mission Was Undermined From Start, WASH. POST
(Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327_pf.html
(“To some extent, the department was set up to fail. It was assigned the awesome responsibility of defending the
homeland without the investigative, intelligence and military powers of the FBI, CIA and the Pentagon.”).
32
33

See infra Part.II.

See infra Part.II.C.; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L.REV. 15, 26 (emphasizing that there is no exhaustive list of mechanisms that must be employed to
insulate an agency from outside political influence, rather there exist various and ever-changing ways in which
agency independence can be achieved).
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thus creating an after-effect that could garner bipartisan support—a robust asylum adjudication
process honoring migrants’ constitutional right to due process while still prioritizing DHS’s
security concerns.
Part I.A.34 of this Comment briefly traces executive agency authority over the
immigration court system prior to September 11, 2001. Part I.B.35 discusses the state of the
lower immigration courts and the BIA after 9/11 with the creation of DHS. Part I.C.36 addresses
two consequential decisions that took place during DHS’s creation, highlighting the ongoing
need for a solution. Part II37 explains the significance of agency expertise in administrative law.
Part II.A.38 utilizes Gonzales v. Oregon39 to highlight the role that expertise plays when statutes
establish “split authority” among agencies. Part II.B.40 argues that DHS should oversee the
immigration court system—thus all asylum adjudications—by examining the HSA’s legislative
history, the DOJ’s lack of resources and specialized knowledge to adequately manage the legal
and emotional complexities involved in making asylum determinations, and the DOJ’s own
rhetoric about its mission. Part II.C.41 describes how the relocation of the lower immigration
courts and the BIA will increase agency independence and result in a more robust delivery of due
process for migrants. Part III42 recommends relocation of the immigration court and the BIA to
DHS through statutory amendment of the HSA. Part III.A.43 details procedural “next steps”
should the relocation take place.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION OVER TIME
A. EXECUTIVE AGENCY AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION BEFORE 9/11
Statutes governing United States’ immigration laws are widely recognized as more
convoluted than the tax code,44 and tracing the ebb and flow of the history of immigration law is
no simpler. While it is evident that the rhetoric surrounding immigration has been riddled with

34

See infra Part.I.A.

35

See infra Part.I.B.

36

See infra Part.I.C.

37

See infra Part.II.

38

See infra Part.II.A.

39

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).

40

See infra Part.II.B.

41

See infra Part.II.C.

42

See infra Part.III.

43

See infra Part.III.A

44

See U.S. Immigration Law, supra note 5.
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xenophobic overtones since the country’s beginning45—a theme still present today46—the
reasons behind the ever-shifting placement of key actors in the immigration system, like the
lower immigration courts and the BIA, are not as apparent.
Perhaps contributing to the country’s inability to fully understand what it takes to achieve
progress on immigration is the complicated history of executive authority over immigration.
1891 marked the implementation of the first major piece of immigration legislation, the
Immigration Act of 1891,47 which officially placed immigration under federal control.48 The
Immigration Act of 1891 established an Office of Immigration within the Department of the
Treasury, allowing the Secretary of Treasury to review all immigration-related decisions.49
Twelve years later, immigration responsibilities moved from the Department of the Treasury to
the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor.50 Afterward, immigration authority was
placed solely under the Department of Labor when the originally conjoined Department of
Commerce and Labor split into two separate entities.51 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) was created in 1933 to spearhead immigration matters within the Department of
Labor.52 Seven years later, the INS moved from the Department of Labor to DOJ, permitting the
Attorney General to create the BIA, an adjudicatory body that reports solely to the Attorney
General in reviewing appeals cases from the lower immigration courts.53 Finally, in 1983, the

45

See Howard S. Myers, III, Immigration Law: An Examination of America’s Immigration System at a Time of
Uncertainty, 44 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 744, 746 (2018)
Those who come hither are generally of the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation . . . and
as few of the English understand the German Language, and so cannot address them either from
the Press or Pulpit, ‘tis almost impossible to remove any prejudices they once entertain . . . Not
being Liberty, they know not how to make a modest use of it.
(quoting Benjamin Franklin).
46

See Michael D. Shear, Trump Presses His Argument of a Border Crisis in California Visit, N.Y. TIMES (April 5,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/politics/trump-border-wall.html (describing President Trump’s
recent comments that the country is “full” and thus cannot “take” any more immigrants).
47

See 26 Stat. 1084, 51 Cong. Ch. 551, Sec. 1 (outlining classes of “aliens” such as “idiots” and “insane persons”
who would not be admitted to the country).
48

See id. (enacting a federal law in the fifty-first session of the United States Congress); see generally Evolution of
the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated April 30, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983.
49

See Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 48 (explaining that the Office of
Immigration had the authority to examine and exclude individuals seeking entry into the United States and deport
individuals who violated the law while still allowing for an appeals process which the Secretary of Treasury could
review).
50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

See id. (emphasizing that the BIA has the sole authority to decide case appeals and reports directly to the Attorney
General); see also 5 Fed. Reg. 3,502 (Sept. 4, 1940) (“In the exercise of the powers conferred upon it the Board of
Immigration Appeals shall be responsible solely to the Attorney General.”).
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EOIR was created within DOJ—the executive body that continues to house the BIA and lower
immigration courts today.54
Created after an internal DOJ reorganization, the EOIR assumed authority over the BIA
and the immigration judges who sit on lower immigration courts throughout the country.55
Unlike before, the creation of the EOIR as a separate entity within DOJ aimed to make the
immigration courts independent of the INS—the office tasked with enforcing federal
immigration laws.56 The Director of the EOIR reports to the Deputy Attorney General.57 The
EOIR’s stated goal is to “adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and timely manner.”58
B. EXECUTIVE AGENCY AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION AFTER 9/11 – THE CREATION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
The events of September 11, 2001 provided for yet another transformation in the way the
country approached immigration. While there is no doubt that 9/11 had lasting effects both
domestically and internationally, some of those consequences are less visible than others.59 Few
recognize the impact that September 11, 2001 had on our immigration system.60
Just a week before 9/11, the climate around immigration reform seemed hopeful.61 On
September 6, 2001, President George W. Bush welcomed Mexican President Vicente Fox to the
White House, and the two leaders came close to reaching a comprehensive immigration reform
plan.62 Though the two men considered each other friends,63 9/11 fundamentally changed the
dynamic of not only their personal relationship, but also the diplomatic ties between the United

54

See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (Feb. 25, 1983).

55

Id.; see also About the Office, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office.
56

See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (referencing goals to make immigration adjudication more “effective and
efficient”).
57

Id. at § 3.0.

58

See About the Office, supra note 55 (“EOIR’s primary mission is to adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and
timely manner, including cases involving detained aliens, criminal aliens, and aliens seeking asylum as a form of
relief from removal, while ensuring the standards of due process and fair treatment for all parties involved.”).
59

See generally 9/11 Attacks, HIST. (last updated May 21, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11attacks (focusing predominantly on the U.S.’s swift military response to 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom).
60

See Myers, supra note 45, at 777 (explaining that 9/11 effectively rewrote an immigration agenda that had been
leaning toward comprehensive reform and returned the focus toward national security and away from attempts at
developing a pathway to citizenship).
61

See America’s Story: An Immigrant Story, CARNEGIE, https://www.carnegie.org/interactives/immigrationreform/#!/ (“Prior to September 11, President Bush had been moving away from the ‘get tough’ ethos that President
Clinton [had] established . . .”).
62

See id. (“If somebody is willing to do jobs others in America aren’t willing to do, we ought to welcome that
person to the country, and we ought to make that a legal part of our economy.”) (quoting President George W. Bush
during the state visit of Mexican President Vicente Fox on September 6, 2001, five days before 9/11).
63

See Alfredo Corchado, Once Solid, the George W. Bush-Vicente Fox partnership faded after 9/11, DALLAS NEWS
(April 2013), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/mexico/2013/04/27/once-solid-the-george-w-bush-vicente-foxpartnership-faded-after-9-11/ (referring to the two leaders as “the two amigos”).
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States and Mexico, bringing any progress on immigration reform to a halt.64 The momentum had
officially shifted.65 As President Vicente Fox urged the United States to push forward on
immigration reform in the aftermath of 9/11,66 legislators on Capitol Hill no longer focused on
fulfilling the United States’ place on the world stage as a “country of immigrants.”67 Rather,
President Bush and members of Congress alike doubled down on “border build-up plans and
heightened restrictions on immigration.”68 Facing increased political pressure and public outcry,
a skeptical President Bush signed the HSA into law, creating a new executive agency—DHS—
tasked with, among other things, securing the nation’s borders.69
The creation of the new department was no easy endeavor and faced criticism from its
inception.70 To this day, critics argue that DHS is nothing more than an instinctual reaction to
the events of September 11, 2001 and have coined it “Frankenstein[’s] monster” of executive
agencies.71 Before 9/11, DOJ acted as the “lead agency” tasked with combatting terrorism and
ensuring national security.72 The HSA altered that makeup, combining twenty-two federal
agencies into one and transferring the functions of those existing agencies that had even a remote
connection to homeland security to the various units within DHS.73
The placement of the EOIR was of utmost importance for the future of immigration law
in the United States and the migrants whose lives depended on the fair adjudication of those
laws. Although the EOIR began functioning years before DHS in 1983, questions remained
64

See id. (“Gone were ambitious plans for immigration, and thrown into question was whether the two countries
could overcome historical suspicion of each other to forge a stronger relationship.”).
65

See Myers, supra note 45, at 777.

66

See Ginger Thompson, Threats and Responses; After 9/11, Fox Still Waits for U.S. Moves on Mexico, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/world/threats-and-responses-after-9-11-fox-still-waits-forus-moves-on-mexico.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=012E890F22BE008D4FB6D224EBF17C06&gwt=pay
(pointing out that President Fox “urged President Bush not to forsake his promise” to work with Mexico on issues
including broad immigration reforms).
67

See America’s Story, supra note 61 (highlighting that nearly one of every four Americans—70 million people—is
an immigrant or the child of parents who came from another country); see also A Nation Built By Immigrants,
GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENTIAL CTR. (2019), https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/resourcesreports/reports/immigration.html (emphasizing that immigrants “played a leading role in building what has become
the most prosperous nation in the history of the world”).
68

See Myers, supra note 45, at 777.

69

Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

70

See Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513, 516 (2003) (“Unlike most
federal initiatives, homeland security draws upon the capabilities of a range of executive departments.”); see also
Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31, (“[T]he department was set up to fail.”).
71

See Ford, supra note 29 (arguing that the Bush administration rallied around the term “homeland security” in
response to the September 11 attacks); see also Matt Mayer, Why We Should Eliminate the Department of Homeland
Security, REASON (June 23, 2015), https://reason.com/2015/06/23/president-bush-was-right-before-he-was-w/
(“Let’s dismantle the Frankenstein monster and divide its responsibilities more effectively.”).
72
73

See Thessin, supra note 70, at 514.

See Myers, supra note 45, at 744; see also Thessin, supra note 70, at 520 (“The new Department includes
components from the Departments of Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services,
Energy, and Defense.”).
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about whether Congress would relocate the EOIR and thus, the immigration courts and the BIA,
to DHS as the new agency took shape.74
C. CONSEQUENTIAL DECISIONS – ESTABLISHING “SPLIT AUTHORITY” OVER ASYLUM CLAIMS
Ultimately, in enacting the HSA, Congress decided that the EOIR, home to the lower
immigration courts and the BIA, should remain part of the DOJ.75 The reasoning behind this
move to this day remains unclear.76 While the “experts”77 decided to relocate the United States’
immigration trial attorneys to DHS, immigration judges, on the other hand, were left out,
destined to remain with the DOJ as part of the EOIR.78 Reports suggest that when pressed on the
issue by Capitol Hill staffers, advisors to DHS’s future Secretary, Tom Ridge, conceded that they
simply had not known that immigration courts existed and thus had never contemplated their
relocation to the new department.79
While the consequences of the experts’ ignorance are plentiful,80 one area in particular
illustrates how this decision, or lack thereof, has led to a fundamental breakdown in due process
for migrants—asylum. The way in which decision makers process asylum claims best illustrates
the logistical nightmare that such shared responsibility between DHS and the DOJ has created.
Final asylum decisions are made either by asylum officers or immigration judges, depending on
the type of application.81 The crux of the problem is that asylum officers are housed under
DHS’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) throughout eight regional
asylum offices,82 while immigration judges and the BIA remain part of the DOJ in the EOIR.83
74

About the Office, supra note 55.

75

Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

76

See Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31 (“Some of the decisions were almost random.”) (“The plan had been put
together with such speed and secrecy that after its release angry officials had to explain to the White House how
their agencies really worked.”).
77

Id. (describing that a “select group of policy aids” soon to be coined the “Gang of Five” had been secretly
commissioned to plot the administration’s “about-face”).
78

See Myers, supra note 45, 779 (outlining that the Homeland Security Act abolished the INS, which previously
housed U.S. immigration trial attorneys, and created the United States Citizenship Services (USCIS)); see also Jason
A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TULANE L. REV. 1, 5 (2014),
available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/986 (establishing that today, immigration attorneys
who represent the government in immigration court are part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)).
79

See Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31 (describing the chaos that ensued on Capitol Hill when experts were
“barraged by Hill staffers” to explain why if trial attorneys were being moved to the new department, immigration
judges were staying with the DOJ).
80

See generally Michael D. Shear et al., The U.S. Immigration System May Have Reached a Breaking Point, N.Y.
TIMES (April 10, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/immigration-border-mexico.html (stating that
although there have been warning signs that the immigration system has been on the brink of collapse for years, the
time for ultimate failure may be right now).
81

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 305-06 (explaining that the asylum process is like playing a game of
“roulette,” affirmative applications being reviewed by asylum officers at the DHS and defensive applications being
reviewed by immigration judges at the DOJ).
82

Id. at 306.

83

Id. at 307.
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Not only does this partition of authority make it impossible for DHS to efficiently do its job, but
many times it also results in an unequal, and thus unconstitutional, adjudication of asylum
seekers’ claims.84 Such statutory slice and dice is concerning and demands a solution, especially
in this context, when it is not uncommon for asylum decisions to be a choice between life and
death for the migrants depending on them.85
It should come as no surprise that DHS faces continued criticism86 and little faith is put in
the United States’ immigration courts87 when the agency tasked with “administer[ing] the
nation’s lawful immigration system”88 does not have statutory authority over immigration judges
and the BIA, thus splitting the asylum process down the middle. Although the judges who sit on
lower immigration courts and the BIA have taken a constitutional oath to perform the same such
“administering” of the nation’s immigration laws as DHS officials,89 the department has no
authority over them. Undoubtedly, “Frankenstein[’s] monster”90 is not equipped to ensure that
all asylum applicants, whether affirmative or defensive, receive adequate constitutional due
process, but finally giving him the statutory tools he needs to succeed could mark the first step
toward a much needed solution.
II. THE AGENCY-AS-EXPERT MODEL
Despite the existence of a Nondelegation Doctrine,91 when designing administrative
agencies, Congress grants significant authority to them to pursue policy solutions in their given
area of practice.92 Because Congress often lacks the specialized knowledge needed to solve
complex policy disputes, agency expertise plays a leading role in justifying the broad authority
84

See id. at 305-06 (an affirmative asylum application is sought by an individual on his own initiative, beginning
when the individual voluntarily identifies himself to DHS, while a defensive applicant applies for asylum only after
having been apprehended by DHS and placed in removal proceedings in immigration court); see also Immigration
Court Independence, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/issues/immigration-courtindependence.
85

See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, SOUTHERN
POVERTY L. CTR. (June 25, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-usimmigration-courts-became-deportation-tool (urging that improvement of the immigration court system is
paramount due to the life-or-death stakes of many immigration cases).
86

See Mayer, supra note 71.

87

See Immigration Court Independence, supra note 84 (“Access to justice in the immigration court system, already
crippled by backlogs and unacceptable disparities in decisionmaking, is being further diminished by highly
politicized DOJ policies.”).
88

See About Us, supra note 30; see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (“[USCIS] shall establish national immigration services policies and priorities . . .”).
89

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9.

90

See Mayer, supra note 71.

91

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States . . . .”); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (providing that Congress may not
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of government).
92

See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (holding that the nondelegation doctrine is
generally weak); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936) (referencing
Congress’s “unwisdom” and providing that the nondelegation doctrine is even more toothless in the realm of foreign
affairs).
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bestowed upon administrative departments, and so should it in contemplating the steps the
United States should take toward comprehensive reform of asylum adjudication.93 In addition to
the general acknowledgement of the prominence of expertise in the field of administrative law,
the importance of agency expertise is further evidenced by landmark decisions like Chevron94
and the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).95
Chevron made clear that “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the [statute] would be in a better position to [choose an appropriate policy].”96
While statutes can be thought of like commands handed down from the legislature to the agency,
sometimes those commands are not always straightforward.97 It is up to the agency to interpret
Congress’s command in a reasonable way.98 Ambiguity is preferred, often intentionally left by
Congress to allow agencies with superior knowledge and resources to do the bulk of statutory
interpretation and implementation.99
Passage of the APA further illustrates the courts’ heavy reliance on awarding deference
to agency interpretations based on their concentrated skillset. The APA mandates that federal
judges affirm agency rules so long as they are not “arbitrary [and] capricious.”100 Deferring
generally to agency expertise, review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and
does not allow a court to substitute its own judgment for that of the expert agency.101 Instead,

93

See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the
Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2015) (“Expertise plays a starring role in administrative law.
Congress established administrative agencies and often gives them substantial discretion because it lacks the
expertise and political agreement to resolve the policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory scheme.”).
94

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

95

79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).

96

See 467 U.S. at 865 (emphasizing that Congress cannot possibly consider and deal with all of the questions that
may arise under a given statutory scheme, and thus decides to “take [its] chances with the scheme devised by the
agency”); see also Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1097
The Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. required deference
to agency constructions of ambiguous statutory language because agencies have greater expertise
and political accountability concerning the policy issues involved in resolving an ambiguity.
97

See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (pointing out that Congress leaves “gaps” in legislation both
explicitly and implicitly).
98

See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (holding that if an agency’s choice represents “a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies,” the Court should “not disturb it”).
99

See 467 U.S. at 843-44 (maintaining that when Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, such
intentional ambiguity acts as an “express delegation of authority to the agency”).
100
101

79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 § 10(e).

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an agency
must only examine relevant data and articulate a “satisfactory explanation” for its decision to be awarded judicial
deference).
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the court must only determine whether the agency’s decision was based on “reasoned
decisionmaking.”102
A. USING GONZALES AS A GUIDE IN “SPLIT AUTHORITY” SITUATIONS
Although the Chevron decision and the implementation of the APA reaffirm the
significance of agency expertise in administrative law, there is evidence that focus on expertise
sometimes evades Congress’s thinking.103 Complicating Congress’s efforts to pass enabling
statutes with agency expertise in mind is the existence of significant overlap among agencies
regulating under the same statute. For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon,104 the Attorney General
issued an interpretive rule on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, claiming he could do so under
the authority granted to him in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which also delegated
significant power to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.105
Ultimately, the court in Gonzales held that when decisionmaking powers are shared among
statutory actors, the agency with the most familiarity and policymaking expertise should be
presumed to be the agency that has been delegated interpretive power for that issue.106
Gonzales highlights a situation parallel to the one currently affecting asylum seekers: two
agencies, with two notably different sets of specialized knowledge, given authority under the
same statute to adjudicate in the same area.107 Because of the HSA’s structure, asylum
applicants are split into two groups, their fate often dependent on which side of the divide they
will fall.108 Agency expertise is emphasized in pursuit of uniformity, but such uniformity is
lacking in the United States’ asylum process.109 Uniform application of the law is not only
desirable, but constitutionally demanded.110 While necessary in all administrative agency
contexts, the need for uniformity, and thus, the significance of expertise, is arguably even more
102

See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) (elaborating that “reasoned
decisionmaking” refers to evidence that the agency articulated “any rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made”).
103

See Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1097 (“For a concept that is so central to administrative law, there has been a
surprisingly impoverished understanding of expertise and its role in the rulemaking process.”).
104

546 U.S. 243 (2006).

105

See id. at 294-95 (highlighting that while the CSA states that physicians must obtain a registration from the
Attorney General for some prescriptions, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has “exclusive authority over
scientific and medical determinations”).
106

See id. at 265 (holding that all decisions of a medical nature are to be made by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the Secretary’s scientific and medical expertise “bind the Attorney General”).
107

Compare 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 § 451(b)(3) (transferring adjudication of asylum and refugee applications
to DHS’s USCIS) with § 1102(g)(1) (granting the Attorney General authority over all laws relating to immigration
and naturalization, including asylum).
108

See supra notes 15 and 17 and accompanying text.

109

See Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations
of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 509 (2013) (explaining that Chevron’s goal when affording
agencies decisionmaking deference is ultimately one of uniformity).
110

See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331 (1921) (“Our whole system of law is predicated on the general
fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. ‘All men are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a
government of laws and not men. . .’”).
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apparent in asylum cases.111 The stakes of an immigration court proceeding are higher than
many other agency adjudications, the consequences of an unfavorable decision often being
deportation to a country that the individual originally fled seeking not just economic, but also
personal security.112
Like parties involved in traditional Article III court proceedings,113 migrants whose
asylum claims come before the immigration court have a right to notice of the legal
consequences of their actions and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal.114
While this point, solidified in the nation’s founding document, is not debatable, the asylum
process is complicated by questions about which administrative agency truly has the expertise
necessary to oversee the fair adjudication of asylum claims.115 Echoing the Court’s view in
Gonzales, it should be presumed that Congress intended to grant authority to the agency most
constitutionally suited to oversee the asylum process116 and guarantee that regardless if asylum
claims are heard by asylum officers or the immigration court, all applicants are in equal receipt
of robust due process.117
B. DHS V. DOJ – WHICH IS THE ASYLUM EXPERT?
Just as the Court in Gonzales declared that the Attorney General was not the appropriate
official to issue science-intensive rules, nor should the Attorney General oversee the lower
immigration courts and the BIA in the adjudication of asylum claims.118 First, the HSA’s
111

See Chaffin, supra note 109, at 503 (setting forth that uniformity is “especially desirable” in the immigration
context).
112

See Fleeing For Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnestyusa.org/fleeing-for-our-lives-central-american-migrant-crisis/ (providing that since 2014, there
has been a 432% increase in asylum applications from countries like Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Panama, many of which indicate that the applicants are “fleeing for their lives”).
113

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
114

See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life,
liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.”);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”);
see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.”).
115

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 307 (explaining that while both DHS asylum officers and DOJ immigration
judges make asylum decisions, DHS asylum officers may also “defer” claims to the immigration court, which
happens in a large portion of cases).
116

See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) (stating that the Attorney General’s attempt to claim authority
over determining appropriate medical standards would be at odds with congressional commentary on the CSA’s
regulation of medical practice).
117

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (advocating that the extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which an individual has “suffer[ed] grievous loss”).
118

See infra Part III.
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legislative history points to Congress’s intention to handcraft DHS as the expert agency on
homeland security issues, one of which involves determining who can and cannot enter the
United States.119 Second, determining the validity of one’s asylum claim involves both fact and
emotion-intensive inquiries into countless aspects of the applicant’s life and home country
conditions, a task that, as evidenced by ongoing disparities, the DOJ does not have the resources
or specialized knowledge to adequately accomplish.120 Last, at a baseline, a study of how each
agency speaks about its own mission provides further evidence that DHS, and not the DOJ, is the
expert agency on immigration.121
Congressional rhetoric leading up to the passage of the HSA points to members’ intense
focus on authority over immigration matters as they drafted the department’s enabling
legislation.122 Members urged that as a result of the events of 9/11, “America must look with
new and urgent scrutiny at illegal immigration, as well as at how to better screen the more than
200 million people traveling to [the] country each year.”123 It was clear—immigration was at the
forefront of lawmakers’ minds.124 Congress was not only concerned with immigration in a
national security sense,125 but also with drafting the legislation in a way that finally gave
immigration matters the “focus and attention they deserve.”126 The new department, while
largely focused on increasing domestic defenses to promote security, also valued aiding
immigrants through the citizenship process and working toward “long-overdue” immigration
reforms.127
To address the complexities that accompany a major government merger, Congress held
hearings, oftentimes focusing specifically on immigration-related issues.128 During one hearing,
members of Congress questioned immigration experts in an attempt to determine whether visas
should continue to be issued by the Department of State, or rather, if that authority should be
transferred to the new DHS.129 Overwhelmingly, testifying experts agreed that the visa function
should be transferred from the Department of State to DHS in an effort to “form a single, unified
Government entity responsible for the formulation and implementation of U.S. immigration
119

See infra note 122 and accompanying text.

120

See infra notes 134 and 135 and accompanying text.

121

See infra note 158 and accompanying text.

122

STAFF OF S. GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., 107TH CONG., CASE FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT
ENDORSED BY BIPARTISAN VOTE OF SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (Comm. Print 2002).
123

Id. at 2.

124

See id. (emphasizing that persisting “internal conflicts” surrounding immigration needed to be dealt with in the
DHS’s enabling legislation).
125

See id. at 1 (referring to “seizing a historic opportunity” to reform the way the U.S. addresses its national security
vulnerabilities).
126

Id. at 2.

127

STAFF OF S. GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM, supra note 122.

128

See Role of Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security Pursuant to H.R. 5005, The Homeland Security
Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5005 Before the Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Sec., And Claims, 107th Cong. 2
(2002) (statement of Congressman Elton Gallegly) (pointing out that many immigration questions remained).
129

See id. at 3 (observing that “it is unclear” why a “hybrid structure” between the State Department and DHS
would be created with respect to the issuance of visas).
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policy.”130 However, at the same time that advocates argued for a uniform, expert immigration
agency with respect to the issuance of visas, no such concerns were raised regarding the split
adjudication of asylum claims.131
Ultimately, Congress’s failure to press immigration experts on the potential repercussions
of such divided authority in the asylum context has resulted in an unequal delivery of justice.132
Currently, there are eight regional asylum offices, where DHS asylum officers make asylum
determinations in a non-adversarial setting, and fifty-eight DOJ immigration courts, each with a
varying number of judges, positioned throughout the country.133 The data depicting how asylum
decisions are being dealt in the immigration courts reveal serious disparities,134 inconsistencies
that are not evidenced in similar decisions being made by DHS asylum officers.135 Although
complete uniformity may be unrealistic, one would expect little variation from one adjudicator to
another, especially in their analysis of the applicable legal standard.136 Unfortunately, such
controlled but acceptable variation does not exist in the immigration courts.137 Instead, they are
riddled with extremes,138 discrepancies existing not just between courts, but also within them.139
Such inconsistencies among and within the immigration courts cannot be ignored, as they
are directly attributable to the lack of immigration expertise within the department tasked with
130

See id. at 7 (statement of John. R. Ratigan, Immigration Consultant, Baker & McKenzie) (advocating that while
his position on creating a “single, unified” immigration entity in charge of issuing visas may seem “radical,” it is in
fact a “rational and sensible change” that would advance a “single policymaking and implementing body in the field
of immigration”).
131

See id. at 66 (statement of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of Immigration Judges)
(acknowledging that some asylum applicants are placed in proceedings before the immigration court but failing to
go so far as to point out potential problems arising from this divided system of asylum adjudication).
132

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 17-72, VARIATION EXISTS IN OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS
ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (2016) (uncovering “significant variations in the outcomes across
immigration courts and judges.”).
133

Jeanne Atkinson & Michelle Mendez et al., The Human Rights of Asylum Seekers in the United States, INTERAM. COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Dec. 2, 2016) at 4.
134

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 342-43 (For example, “female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate
of 53.8%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.7%. An asylum applicant assigned by chance to a
female judge therefore had a 44% better chance of prevailing than an applicant assigned to a male judge.”); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 132 (revealing that asylum applications before the Atlanta
Immigration Court had a grant rate of 6%, while the New York Immigration Court granted asylum at a rate of 54%).
135

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 342-43 (emphasizing that, “In contrast, no appreciable difference existed in
the grant rates of male and female [DHS] asylum officers.”) (emphasis added).
136

See id. at 306 (differentiating that while variation should be minimal among adjudicators with respect to legal
analysis, assessments of credibility may be more prone to variation based on the subjective inquiry required).
137

See TRACIMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS – ASYLUM (2018), available at
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/ (documenting that in the Houston, Dallas, Charlotte, and Las
Vegas regional courts, statistics indicate that applicants are granted asylum at a rate of nearly 0%).
138

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 328 (providing that Chinese asylum seekers had a 7% success rate in
Atlanta, 76% success rate in Orlando, and a 47% success rate nationwide).
139

See id. at 335-36 (describing that in Miami three judges granted asylum at rates of only 3%, 5%, and 6%, while
three different judges granted asylum at 75%, 61%, and 38%).
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overseeing them—the DOJ.140 The absence of specialized immigration knowledge within the
DOJ is not something that can be easily corrected.141 As has been previously emphasized,
immigration law is complicated,142 and DHS is the only administrative agency with the protocols
in place to make life-altering asylum decisions in a constitutionally permissible way.143
Although the structure of the HSA makes DHS asylum officers and DOJ immigration judges
equally responsible for using their knowledge and training to determine whether an asylum
applicant’s story is true, and would thus render the individual eligible for asylum in the United
States,144 the resources deployed by the DOJ to ensure that such responsibility is being taken
seriously are anything but equal to those utilized by DHS.145
Making a final asylum decision requires both legal expertise and emotional intuition.146
Officials must perform an intense assessment of credibility about the applicant’s description of
her personal experiences and likelihood of actual or threatened persecution if forced to return to
her country of origin.147 To do that, DHS requires every asylum officer to complete an intensive
five-week basic training module, which includes periodic testing.148 Further, once asylum
officers are in their regional placements, regional offices conduct four hours of training each
week on prominent legal issues, country conditions, and procedures.149 A supervisory officer,
who has been vetted, trained, and tested on immigration law, reviews each asylum decision made
by regional asylum officers before the decision is finalized.150 Above the supervisory officer is a
training officer who then re-reviews the supervisor’s judgement and reports to the Regional
Director when inconsistencies arise.151
140

See id. at 378 (comparing the current way in which asylum decisions are made by DOJ immigration judges to “a
spin of the wheel of chance”).
141

See, e.g. Governor in Council Appointed Members, IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, https://irbcisr.gc.ca/en/jobs/Pages/MemComEmpl.aspx (last updated June 25, 2018) (outlining that Canadian immigration
judges are selected through a rigorous hiring process that requires evaluation of the applicant’s competency, selfcontrol, and cultural sensibility, among other factors).
142

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

143

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 381 (pointing out that DHS asylum officers currently receive much more
“initial and ongoing training” than that required of DOJ’s immigration judges).
144

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

145

See IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS – ASYLUM, supra note 137 (documenting the DOJ’s lackluster effort to
appoint judges of diverse professional backgrounds with five of the six Atlanta immigration judges having a law
enforcement background and four of those five previously serving as federal prosecutors prior to becoming
immigration judges).
146

See Credible and Reasonable Fear Interviews, IMMIGR. JUST. CAMPAIGN, https://www.immigrationjustice.us/gettrained/cfi-rfi (establishing that the credible fear interviews initially required by those seeking asylum task asylum
officers with determining an applicant’s eligibility based on his direct testimony regarding his need for protection
from persecution).
147

See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 306.

148

Id. at 311.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.
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In all, an asylum decision rendered by a DHS asylum officer is not definitive until it has
been approved by three—and, in difficult and inconsistent cases, four—immigration law
professionals.152 In addition, each regional office hires staff dedicated solely to conducting
country research, participating in conference calls with headquarters, and identifying emerging
patterns in asylum claims, all of which later gets reported to asylum officers to aid them in
making their decisions.153
While it is true that the DOJ provides some training, a 2018 training manual reveals that a
recent educational program for incoming immigration judges lasted only three days from around
8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.154 The training consisted mainly of PowerPoint presentations and
breakout sessions, rather than intensive study and subsequent testing on substantive legal
material, and did not appear to be compulsory.155 The DOJ cannot teach immigration law over
the course of three days in a style reminiscent of a first-year law school class.156 Unlike the DOJ,
DHS has put in place the training and safeguards needed in order to legitimately call itself the
expert agency in asylum adjudication.157
Even with DHS’s superior knowledge in immigration matters readily apparent, the
agency’s own words and mission additionally support its immigration expertise.158 A brief
search of DHS’s website reveals “Secur[ing] U.S. Borders and Approaches,” as one of the
department’s “core missions.” 159 Within the description of this mission, it mentions
immigration three times.160 One of the four goals of the mission is to “Enforce U.S. Immigration
Laws”—DHS further referencing its “responsibility” to “faithfully” do so.161 A similar search of
the DOJ’s mission statement reveals no mention of immigration specifically, though it does
152

Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 311.

153

Id.

154

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 2018 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW LEGAL TRAINING PROGRAM (June 2018) (unpublished document obtained by FOIA

request

by Hoppock Law Firm and published online by American Immigration Lawyers Association),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-2018-training-program-judges.
155

See id.

156

See Michelle Mark, Jeff Sessions Said Immigrants Should ‘Wait Their Turn’ to Come to the US – Here’s How
Complicated that Process Can Be, BUS. INSIDER (May 3, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-greencard-visa-legal-immigration-us-news-trump-2017-4 (depicting various pathways and roadblocks to legally
immigrating to the United States that make lawful immigration “challenging, if not impossible”).
157

Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES (last updated Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs (“All Asylum
Officers are required to attend and complete the Asylum Officer Basic Training Course (AOBTC), which is a
national training course that is specific to asylum adjudications. Instructors for this course are from HQ Asylum
Division and field Asylum offices, as well as non-governmental organizations, law schools, and the UNHCR.”).
158

Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches, THE U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/administer-immigration-laws (last updated July 5, 2019).
159

Id.

160

See id. (outlining that DHS is responsible for addressing individuals who ignore lawful immigration processes,
enforcing immigration laws, and properly administering immigration benefits) (emphasis added).
161

See id. (“It is DHS’s responsibility to faithfully execute and enforce the immigration laws of the United States in
a manner that eliminates [sic] abuses.”).
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describe the department’s duty to “enforce the law” and “defend the interests of the United States
according to the law” more generally.162 The closest the DOJ comes to referencing its
responsibilities vis-à-vis immigration is to describe its role in “ensur[ing] public safety against
threats foreign and domestic.”163
Though Congress clearly intended to handcraft an expert immigration agency in the wake
of 9/11,164 and DHS’s superior knowledge in handling both legally and emotionally complex
asylum adjudications is evidenced by its ongoing efforts to require staff to undergo rigorous
training and continuing education,165 the HSA’s business remains unfinished.166 Even the DOJ
does not attempt to coin itself as an agency with expert knowledge and interest in immigration,167
and neither should the U.S. Congress.168 While such “split authority” is not uncommon
throughout statutory schemes,169 Congress should take a page from the Supreme Court’s
Gonzales opinion and put an end to the divided authority over asylum adjudication that does
nothing more than perpetuate injustice.170
C. A WELCOMED CONSEQUENCE – INCREASED DHS INDEPENDENCE
Though relying on the agency-as-expert model is persuasive, the argument to relocate the
lower immigration courts and the BIA does not stop there. Critics are quick to point out that
agencies cannot base decisionmaking purely on expertise because of the existence of countless
fluctuating factors that agencies must balance, some of which are political.171 This point is not
up for debate—it’s true.172 Though taken,173 the skepticism surrounding an agency’s ability to
independently assert its expertise in the decisionmaking process does not have to be understood

162

About DOJ, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about.

163

Id.

164

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

165

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

166

See Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts, APPLESEED (May 2009) at 15
(urging that it makes little sense that asylum officers receive more intensive training than the immigration judges
who may be tasked with reviewing their decisions upon appeal).
167

See supra note 162 and accompanying text.

168

See infra Part.III.

169

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

170

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

171

See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 970 (1997) (“At its core, the argument
is that administrative action . . . cannot be understood in the neutral, scientific, apolitical sense in which it was
understood by the founders of the administrative state. It is instead now seen by all to be essentially ‘political’—
involving an essentially ‘political choice.’”).
172

See id. at 967-68 (emphasizing that a simple dichotomy between law and politics does not exist and that tension
between the legal and the political will endure even when agencies attempt to make decisions based on expert
knowledge alone).
173

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The
accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of
unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.”).
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as a concession to the core argument made in this Comment.174 Rather, relocating the
immigration court and the BIA to DHS will lead to increased independence throughout the
agency175 and further insulate the immigration courts from political influence when overseeing
the adjudication of asylum claims.
Despite the commonly understood theory that agencies adhere neatly to a binary
division—either executive or independent—it is impossible to pin down a single form by which
an agency can earn its “independent” status.176 Instead, to accurately determine an agency’s
level of independence, various factors stemming from the agency’s enabling legislation must be
considered.177 At the heart of an analysis of agency independence is an effort to deconstruct the
agency’s relationship to the President.178 Though the consensus view believes that the dividing
line between independent and executive agencies lies in the presence of for-cause removal
protection,179 not all agencies considered independent possess such a clause.180
Relocating the immigration court system to DHS would grant the agency with litigation
authority, an added element of agency power that would promote the use of impartial,
independent expertise while overseeing asylum adjudications.181 Since 1966, the DOJ has had
centralized-agency litigation authority.182 The default understanding is that the Attorney General
will spearhead all litigation that names the United States as a party, “[e]xcept as otherwise
authorized by law.”183 While Congress has outlined some exceptions to the centralized-litigation
174

See Kirti Datla, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769
(2013) (“As it turns out, there is no single feature, structural or functional, that every agency thought of as
independent shares—not even the for-cause removal provision commonly associated with independence.”).
175

See id. at 769-70 (explaining that agency independence should be understood as falling within a spectrum and
that numerous factors in an agency’s enabling legislation may allow it to function as an independent, expertisefocused rule maker).
176

See id. at 772 (“Agencies cannot be neatly divided into two categories. Independent agencies are almost always
defined as agencies with a for-cause removal provision limiting the President’s power to remove the agencies’ heads
to cases of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’ But, as some scholars acknowledge, the socalled independent agencies do not share a single form.”).
177

See id. (analyzing removal protection, specified tenure, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements,
litigation authority, budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication authority).
178

See id. at 773 (explaining that achieving status as an independent agency signifies limitations on presidential
control that restrict the President beyond what is specified in the agency’s enabling legislation).
179

See Datla, supra note 174, at 778 (basing such view on the 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States); see also Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935) (holding that the President could
not remove a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) official based solely on their policy disagreements and declaring the
FTC an agency completely independent of presidential control).
180

See Adrian Vermuele, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2013) (“There are
many important agencies that are conventionally treated as independent, yet whose heads lack for-cause tenure
protection.”); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000).
181

See Datla, supra note 174, at 777 (arguing that the goal of formulating independent agencies is to promote
impartial expertise in administrative proceedings and rulemaking).
182

See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (reserving the “conduct of litigation” to the DOJ).

183

Id.
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authority the DOJ currently possesses, the exceptions are not systematic.184 Though Congress’s
decisionmaking process may not be predictable, history shows that such exceptions are
possible.185 If Congress grants DHS litigation authority by allowing it to oversee the
immigration court system, it will increase both the agency’s level of independence from the
executive and its ability to ensure consistent asylum determinations made by both DHS asylum
officers and immigration judges.186
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Deference Principle of administrative law addresses those statutory situations that
leave practitioners scratching their heads—“split authority” circumstances like the one described
throughout this Comment.187 Courts must show deference to agency judgments based on the
agency’s superior technical knowledge,188 and though the judgments made by immigration
judges are awarded deference every day, there is no evidence that the DOJ possesses such
knowledge, education, or training in the area of immigration.189 Instead, immigration lawyers
who regularly appear before the immigration courts speak of a high level of unprofessionalism
among immigration judges who approach asylum claims with a “presumptive skepticism” rather
than as neutral arbiters of justice.190 Former immigration judges themselves have gone so far as

184

See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation
Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 207-08 (1998) (explaining that in decentralizing litigation authority for
some administrative agencies, Congress must work against an intense backdrop of often conflicting preferences).
185

Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e), 2604(f), 2606 (granting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) litigation
authority over specific violations of the Toxic Substances Control Act); see also id. § 56(a)-(c) (2006) (empowering
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with broad litigation authority).
186

See Datla, supra note 174, at 801 (“The effect of independent litigation authority is a degree of insulation from
executive control.”).
187

The Deference Principle, 2 STATE ENV’T L. § 15:48 (2018).

188

Id.
Courts reviewing an agency’s actions regularly comment that they lack the expertise necessary to
“second-guess” the agency’s conclusions. Asserting that they cannot match the agency’s technical
knowledge, courts unanimously endorse the principle that they must defer to the agency’s
expertise in conducting judicial review of agency decisionmaking.
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Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign-trump
(describing a training conference in which a former immigration judge, Rebecca Jamil, states, “The entire
conference was profoundly disturbing. Do things as fast as possible. There was an overarching theme of
disbelieving aliens and their claims and how to remove people faster. That is not what I saw my job as an
immigration judge to be. I was not trained to do that.”).
190

See Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note 166, at 12
(describing one immigration judge’s conduct as “so egregious that law school clinics will not allow their students to
appear in front of her”); see also See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a
Deportation Tool, supra note 85, at 12 (“[I]mmigration judges approached asylum claims with ‘presumptive
skepticism’ and often questioned respondents the way a government attorney would on cross-examination, rather
than conducting proceedings in a fair and neutral manner.”).
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to reveal, “[T]here isn’t even any attempt at proper training. The whole indoctrination is you’re
not judges, you’re really enforcement . . . .”191
Despite the constant skepticism and increased scrutiny that DHS has faced both
historically and under the current administration, nothing inherently wrong or corrupt exists
regarding the officials that comprise the agency. In fact, DHS has put plans in place in an effort
to retain employees with highly specialized knowledge who have often worked with the
department from its beginning.192 The issue stems not from the government officials who
comprise the department, rather, the real problem comes from the department’s enabling
legislation: 187 pages of statutory slice and dice between existing agencies, executive offices,
and various other administrative actors.193
The HSA in its current form does not work,194 and the unfinished statutory business has
led to a deprivation of asylum seekers’ due process rights.195 Considering the abundant
importance placed on agency expertise in the world of administrative law, Congress should
amend the HSA to transfer the immigration court and the BIA to DHS. By removing the courts
from the DOJ, Congress would place them where they have rightly belonged since DHS’s
creation seventeen years ago.196
Seven years before DHS’s creation, Justice Breyer, in his book, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION,197 warned against agencies “implicitly and often
inconsistently” making decisions.198 Currently, the nation faces the exact situation Justice
Breyer warned of. Immigration judges who are ill-prepared and ill-equipped are arbitrarily
making life-or-death asylum decisions.199 Removing these judges from an agency unable to
train, counsel, and supervise them appropriately and placing them under DHS control, which
holds itself out as an expert in immigration and has the training procedures in place to show for
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See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, supra note
85, at 18.
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See Recruitment and Retention Incentives, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY MGMT. DIRECTIVE SYS. (March 31,
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unique qualifications in an effort to retain the employee).
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Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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See Thessin, supra note 70, at 514 (“Although some consolidation of the myriad agency components that are
charged with homeland security is needed, the HSA is too broad in scope and transfers too much power to the
President.”).
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See Immigration Court Independence, supra note 84 (“[T]he DOJ and its component, the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), have introduced or perpetuated a number of policies that are further diminishing
weakened due process protections while exacerbating inefficiencies.”).
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Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31.
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See Ilyce Shugall, Op Ed: Why I Resigned as an Immigration Judge, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-03/immigration-court-judge-asylum-trump-policies (describing the
unworkable and unattainable performance metrics the DOJ is imposing upon immigration judges and the
“demoralizing” effect they’ve had).
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it, will signify an incremental step toward much needed immigration reform in the United
States.200
A. PROCEDURAL “NEXT STEPS”
Justice demands that administrative officials have expertise in their respective agency
missions.201 Just as society rightfully expects a heart surgeon to be completely versed in
cardiovascular health, and an oncologist to have superior knowledge on the treatment of cancer,
asylum applicants whose lives depend on an administrative agency’s decision must have
confidence in its ability to offer a professional, objective “diagnosis.”202 Though complete
public trust in the expert judgment of administrative agencies would be ideal,203 no easy solution
exists when attempting to improve difficult, life-altering processes like those that take place in
the immigration court system.204
While this Comment relies on the agency-as-expert model to argue that Congress should
relocate the lower immigration courts and the BIA to DHS,205 the push for progress must go
further. Admittedly, the agency-as-expert model is not fool proof, and DHS must strictly adhere
to the APA to ensure that DHS fully lives up to its potential as the immigration expert.206
To further provide for a robust system of due process in the immigration court, upon
transfer to DHS, Congress should require immigration judges, both on lower immigration courts
and the BIA, to become official administrative law judges (ALJs),207 subject to all APA
procedures and guidelines. While the current immigration court system has a reputation of
lackluster hiring procedures,208 ALJ appointments follow APA standards and require judges to
200

See supra Part.II.B.

201

See Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1138 (revealing the ongoing demand and challenge in the United States to
“legitimize” public administration).
202

See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (1975)
(arguing that persons subject to the administrator’s control should be no more liable to his arbitrary will than are
patients remitted to the care of a skilled doctor).
203

See Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1138 (describing the ongoing challenge the United States faces in striving to
“legitimize” public administration).
204

See Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3169 (2010) (emphasizing the vast complexity
of “administrative structures, exercising different kinds of administrative authority, to achieve their legislatively
mandated objectives.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1134 (“Expertise is complex,
complicated, and multifaceted.”).
205

See supra Part.II.

206

See 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (stating that the goal of the APA is to “improve the administration of
justice” and promote “fair administrative procedure”).
207

See Administrative Law Judges, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/administrative-law-judges/
(last updated 2019) (“In the United States, an administrative law judge, or ALJ, serves as the judge and trier of fact
who presides over administrative hearings.”).
208

See 2019 Update Report – Reforming the Immigration System – Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness,
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, supra note 26 (explaining that public
skepticism about the immigration court system stems partially due to allegations of politicized, non-credential based
hiring).
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complete a four-hour written and oral exam before a panel prior to taking the bench.209 Notably,
the ALJ appointment process is the “only one based on merit in the United States.”210 With that,
the Attorney General should no longer appoint immigration judges to serve at his or her
pleasure.211 Rather, DHS should provide oversight and hire these judges based on ability and
proven expertise in immigration law. Congress can implement this procedural next step
relatively easily, as DHS asylum officers already undergo extensive training before earning the
privilege to render asylum decisions.212
CONCLUSION
The United States cannot turn away asylum seekers.213 Óscar and Valeria had a legal
right to present themselves at the border and request asylum.214 The United States denied them
of that right, and the United States must rectify such injustices.215 Relocating the immigration
court system to DHS will reduce the feeling of impossibility that DOJ immigration judges
currently face and provide them with the resources they need to deliver due process to those who
stand before them.216 Most importantly, the relocation will allow asylum applicants to present
their claims with confidence, rather than fear, with assurance that regardless of whether they are
presenting their claims before an asylum officer or immigration judge, they have the same shot at
success.217
While not a perfect agency, DHS is in the best position to oversee asylum adjudication
and the immigration court system.218 Longstanding emphasis on agency expertise,219 the HSA’s
legislative history,220 the DOJ’s inability to apply niche-level knowledge when overseeing
asylum determinations made by immigration judges,221 and DHS and DOJ’s own words all
209

See Administrative Law Judges, supra note 207 (explaining that the panel is made up of representatives from the
American Bar Association, the Office of Personnel Management, and a current federal ALJ).
210
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under the Attorney General’s sole discretion).
212

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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See generally Shaw Drake & Edgar Saldivar, Trump Administration Is Illegally Turning Away Asylum Seekers,
ACLU (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trump-administration-illegally-turning-awayasylum-seekers (reiterating that both U.S. and international law dictate that “noncitizens arriving at our borders have
a right to apply for asylum,” and they cannot legally be turned away).
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support relocation.222 Congress should amend the HSA to relocate the immigration court and the
BIA from the DOJ to DHS, finally permitting the executive agency where expertise in
immigration matters truly lies to oversee all asylum adjudications.223
True immigration reform continues to evade the United States all while its bronze lady
urges, “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free . . . .”224
Those very words lead tens of thousands of asylum seekers to knock on the nation’s door each
year,225 and they too should be the words used to guide the country in its pursuit of a just asylum
adjudication process.226

222
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223
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